Scaling Monosemanticity: Extracting Interpretable Features from Claude 3 Sonnet

We demonstrate that sparse autoencoders can extract interpretable features from Claude 3 Sonnet, a production-scale language model, addressing the open question of whether dictionary learning methods scale beyond small transformers. We trained sparse autoencoders with up to 34 million features on the model's middle layer residual stream, using scaling laws to guide hyperparameter selection. The resulting features are multilingual and multimodal (generalizing to images despite text-only training), respond to both concrete instances and abstract discussions of concepts, and can be used to steer model behavior in ways consistent with their interpretations. We find features corresponding to famous entities and locations, as well as more abstract concepts like sarcasm or errors in code. We also identify features relevant to ways in which language models might cause harm--including features representing deception, power-seeking, sycophancy, and bias--and show that these causally influence model outputs when manipulated. Additionally, we conduct analyses of feature interpretability, geometry, and computational function. However, significant limitations remain: our suite of features is incomplete, and we lack rigorous methods for evaluating whether our features faithfully capture model computations.

Auditing language models for hidden objectives

We study the feasibility of conducting alignment audits: investigations into whether models have undesired objectives. As a testbed, we train a language model with a hidden objective. Our training pipeline first teaches the model about exploitable errors in RLHF reward models (RMs), then trains the model to exploit some of these errors. We verify via out-of-distribution evaluations that the model generalizes to exhibit whatever behaviors it believes RMs rate highly, including ones not reinforced during training. We leverage this model to study alignment audits in two ways. First, we conduct a blind auditing game where four teams, unaware of the model's hidden objective or training, investigate it for concerning behaviors and their causes. Three teams successfully uncovered the model's hidden objective using techniques including interpretability with sparse autoencoders (SAEs), behavioral attacks, and training data analysis. Second, we conduct an unblinded follow-up study of eight techniques for auditing the model, analyzing their strengths and limitations. Overall, our work provides a concrete example of using alignment audits to discover a model's hidden objective and proposes a methodology for practicing and validating progress in alignment auditing.